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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WILLIAM SHERRATT,

:

Petitioner / Appellant,

:

v.

:

UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, et al.,

:

Respondents / Appellees.

:

Case No. 20090310-CA

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS / APPELLEES

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) (West Supp. 2009). It was transferred to this Court on
May 14, 2009, pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Sherratt cannot challenge the validity of his convictions in a Rule 65B petition
for extraordinary relief against the Utah Board of Pardons and the Utah State Prison.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised in the respondents'
motion to dismiss. R. 497-98.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The legal reasoning of a court granting an
extraordinary writ is reviewed for correctness. Rice v. Div. of Securities, 2004 UT App
215,U4,95P.3dll69.

1

2. Sherratt has no federal constitutional right to parole. He was given the due
process mandated by the Utah State Constitution. No constitutional right of the petitioner
was violated.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised in the respondents'
motion to dismiss. R. 493-511.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The legal reasoning of a court granting an
extraordinary writ is reviewed for correctness. Rice v. Div. of Securities, 2004 UT App
215,1(4, 95 P.3d 1169.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Appendix A to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
William Sherratt filed this petition for extraordinary relief on May 3, 2006. R. 1294. The district court ordered the Attorney General's Office to respond to the petition
on December 19, 2008. R. 441-43. On January 21, 2009, the respondents, Utah Board of
Pardons and the Utah State Prison, filed their answer (R. 465-77) and their motion to
dismiss. R. 478-808. The motion to dismiss was granted on February 18, 2009. R. 85664. Sherratt filed his notice of appeal on March 10, 2009. R. 886.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
William Sherratt was convicted of two counts of rape, a first degree felony. R.
517. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of five years to life on May 30, 2000. R.
518. On July 3, 2000, the Utah Board of Pardons scheduled Sherratt's original parole
2

hearing to be held during the month of May, 2005. R. 521. Originally, the board asked
that an alienist report be prepared before the hearing. On March 25, 2004, the board
decided that it didn't need an alienist report for the original parole hearing. R. 523.
Sherratt's original parole hearing was held on May 5, 2005. Before the hearing,
Sherratt was given copies of the material that was in the board's file that would be
considered at the hearing. He acknowledged receipt of this material. R. 535, 559.1
On May 12, 2005, the board decided to give Sherratt a rehearing date of February,
2009. The board requested that a sex offender therapy memo be prepared prior to the
rehearing. R. 525. The board also gave Sherratt notice of what aggravating
circumstances it relied upon in reaching its decision. R. 527.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Sherratt seeks to challenge the validity of his two rape convictions through an
action brought against the Utah State Board of Pardons and the Utah State Prison. The
district court correctly refused to consider these claims in a Rule 65B proceeding. They
need to be properly brought under Rule 65C.
Petitioner's constitutional claims also fail. Sherratt has no federal constitutional
right to parole. Under Utah law, he has a limited due process right to be given notice of
the date of his original parole hearing and access to the material that will be considered by

1

Sherratt, at his request, was given a copy of the transcript of the original parole
hearing. R. 555-75.
3

the board at the hearing. Sherratt acknowledged verbally and in writing that he had
received this due process. No Utah constitutional right of the petitioner was violated.
ARGUMENT
I. A RULE 65B PETITION CANNOT BE USED TO CHALLENGE
THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTIONS
Many of the issues raised by the petitioner in his opening brief deal with
challenges to his convictions. Sherratt's claims concerning his convictions are not proper
subjects for a Rule 65B petition. Sherratt sought to use his petition to challenge his
criminal convictions under the guise of complaining that the Board of Pardons did not
properly consider his claims that his convictions were defective. To do so would bring
into question the validity of his convictions. But the present action is a Rule 65B petition
challenging the actions of the Board and the Utah State Prison. Petitioner has failed to
identify any authority the respondents might have to reverse his convictions. The attack
upon petitioner's convictions cannot be raised in this proceeding. Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 65C provides the proper procedure for such a challenge.
The basis upon which "a person may petition the court for
extraordinary relief1 under rule 65B now only includes any of the grounds
set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal liberty),
paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate authority),
or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority, the
failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of Pardons and
Parole). Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) (2003). The use of rule 65B is limited to
cases ff[w]here no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available,"
and the scope of relief under paragraph (b) for "[w]rongful restraints on
personal liberty,11 Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a)-(b), is now narrowed to
"proceedings involving wrongful restraint on personal liberty other than
those governed by Rule 65C." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (2003) advisory
4

committee note (emphasis added). Therefore, because rule 65C governs
proceedings filed under the PCRA, which is the governing statute for "any
person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and
who has exhausted all other legal remedies/1 Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a102(1), rule 65B is not applicable in a challenge focused on a criminal
conviction, even if a restriction on liberty results from the conviction.
Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, 1[18, 89 P.3d 196, aff d on other grounds. 2005 UT
61,122P.3d628..
While the Utah Supreme Court affirmed Manning on other grounds, it agreed with
this Court that "a defendant may no longer file a petition pursuant to rule 65B(b) in
'instances governed by Rule 6 5 C " Manning v. State. 2005 UT 61,1J23, 122 P.3d 628.2
The district court correctly rejected these claims as inappropriately brought in the
present action. R. 860 ^|10. That decision should be affirmed on appeal.
II. PETITIONER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT
VIOLATED
Sherratt claims that his constitutional rights were violated by the manner in which
the board held the petitioner's initial parole hearing. Sherratt had no federal
constitutional right that was implicated in the board's decision-making process. His Utah
constitutional rights were not violated.

2

This is not the first time that Sherratt has improperly sought to challenge his
convictions in a Rule 65B proceeding. In Sherratt v. Friel 2007 UT App 3, *2, this Court
held that "Sherratt's rule 65B petition for extraordinary relief was not a proper vehicle to
challenge his underlying conviction." A copy of this unpublished decision is attached as
Addendum C.
5

Unless Sherratt could show the existence of a federally protected liberty interest
in parole, no federal constitutional right was implicated by the board's actions. He must
first have a legitimate claim of entitlement to parole. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1978). "Not only is there no constitutional or inherent right to
receive parole prior to the expiration of a valid sentence, but, absent state standards for
the granting of parole, decisions of a parole board do not automatically invoke due
process protections." Malek v. Haun, 26 F.3d 1013, 1015 (10th Cir. 1994). In Malek. the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there is no federal constitutional right implicated
by Utah parole decisions.
Utah law mandates that board decisions be accorded great deference and, as a
general rule, board decisions are not subject to judicial review. Walker v. State, 902 P.2d
148, 150 (Utah App. 1995). Indeed, the board has exclusive authority to determine the
actual number of years a defendant is to serve, Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah
1994)(citations omitted), and courts do not "sit as a panel of review on the result, absent
some other constitutional claim." Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947
(Utah 1994).
Only two limited exceptions allow for judicial review of Board decisions: 1) to
assure that procedural due process was not denied, Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons,
870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993) and 2) where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Ward
v. Smith, 573 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1978). Judicial review addresses "the fairness of the
process by which the Board undertakes its sentencing function," not the result. Padilla v.
6

Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted).
"[T]wo due process requirements must be met in parole grant hearings. First, an inmate
must receive adequate notice to prepare for a parole hearing. Second, an inmate must
receive copies or a summary of the information in the Board's file upon which the Board
will rely in deciding whether to grant parole." Peterson v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. 931 P.2d
147, 150 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted).
The acknowledgement form signed by Sherratt on April 26, 2005, states that he
received the documents the board would consider over a week before his original parole
hearing. R. 535. The same document also shows the date of the parole hearing would be
May 5, 2005. At the hearing, Sherratt agreed that he had been given an opportunity to
review this information and that he was comfortable in proceeding with the hearing. R.
559.
Nor was any constitutional right violated by the fact that Sherratt's access to sex
offender therapy was limited because of his refusal to admit that he was guilty of his
crimes. R. 537-44. The United States Supreme Court has held that an inmate's
constitutional rights are not violated by requiring he acknowledge his guilt before he can
receive such treatment. McKune v. Lile. 536 U.S. 24, 33 and 37-39 (2002).
The same result was reached by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Pritchett 2003
UT 24,1fl[28-33, 69 P.3d 1278 (holding the Utah probation statute is not unconstitutional
because it required admission of guilt as a prerequisite to admission to certain sex
offender therapy programs). Petitioner refused to admit his guilt. Accordingly, he was
7

ineligible for participation in the sex offender therapy program at the Prison and was
therefore removed from the program.
The district court correctly held that Sherratt's constitutional rights were not
violated and its decision should be affirmed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, respondents ask this Court to affirm the dismissal of
this action.
RESPONDENTS DO NOT DESIRE ORAL ARGUMENT
OR A PUBLISHED OPINION
Respondents / appellees do not request oral argument and a published opinion in
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already been decided by this
Court and the Utah Supreme Court, are not such that oral argument or a published opinion
is necessary, though respondents desire to participate in oral argument if such is held by
the Court.
Respectfully submitted this

/&

day of September, 2009.

t&LJ/L
BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents / Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondents / Appellees, postage prepaid, to the following on this / P

day of

September, 2009:
William Sherratt
Inmate #30335
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Petitioner/Appellant Pro Se
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ADDENDUM "A

Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief.
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, a
person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph
(b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use
of public or corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial
authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of Pardons and Parole).
There shall be no special form of writ. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, the
procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the
extent that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for
extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(b)(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall govern all
petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court
may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph.
(b)(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of
the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in which
the alleged restraint is occurring.
(b)(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a short, plain statement
of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and
the place where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if
known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has already been
adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior
proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings
filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the restraint.
(b)(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two
copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(b)(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court that
the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other
reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue
an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons for
this conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall
be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the
order of dismissal.
(b)(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous on its face, the
court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order

directing the respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within
which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an
order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the
restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the
person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so restrained has been transferred to
any other person, and if so, the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason
or authority for the transfer. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the court
from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive motion.
(b)(7) Temporary relief If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed
from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing
order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the
court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of such other persons
as may be appropriate.
(b)(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it appears
that a person other than the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the
hearing order and any other process issued by the court may be served on the person having
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been named as respondent
in the action.
(b)(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of the person alleged to be
restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the person from
the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to law.
(b)(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court shall
hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or
other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall state
the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring before
it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right to be present at the
hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough is
stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent.
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.
(c)(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, and when directed to do
so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this
paragraph. Any person who is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may
petition the court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an office
unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by a person other than the
attorney general under this paragraph shall be brought in the name of the petitioner, and the

petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties
shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73.
(c)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an
office in a corporation created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer
does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons act as a
corporation in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where any corporation
has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of
corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights,
privileges or franchises.
(c)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice be
given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the
adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in
accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A.
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions by board of
pardons and parole.
(d)(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by any of the acts
enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court for relief.
(d)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court,
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an
inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the Board of
Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an act required by
constitutional or statutory law.
(d)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice be
given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the
adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior court,
administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to the
court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in
accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A.
(d)(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's
review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued
its authority.
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RULING AND ORDER WITHDRAWING
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL,
DISMISSING PETITION FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF, AND
DENYING QUO WARRANTO RELIEF

WILLIAM SHERRATT,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No.060907262

UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, et al,
Respondent.

Judge Denise Posse Lindberg

Tfl
On May 3, 2006, Petitioner filed a 250 page Petition for Extraordinary Relief under Utah
R. Civ. P. 65B. Since that time Petitioner has filed numerous other motions, complaints, etc., to
which he has attached this case number. Most of those motions have now been ruled upon, but
the underlying Rule 65B Petition has never been addressed directly. When this problem was
brought to the Court's attention on or about December 15, 2008, the Court called for a response
from the Utah Attorney General's office (the "AG"). Thereafter, the Court also referred the
matter to the Utah Bar to explore the possible appointment of pro bono counsel to assist Mr.
Sherratt. The Utah Bar has since informed the Court that it has recently had a spate of requests
for assistance With pro bono appointments and is unable, at this point, to identify counsel willing
to accept appointment. The Court had sought the assistance of pro bono counsel to narrow and
frame the issues for decision. However, given that attempts to secure pro bono assistance may
further delay an already long-delayed ruling in this case, and after reviewing the parties' thorough
submissions, the Court is satisfied that it has before it all the information necessary to consider
and rule on the merits of the Petition without further assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the
Court WITHDRAWS its prior Order appointing counsel. After considering the briefing of the
parties and reviewing the supporting documentation and applicable case law, the Court agrees
with Respondent that the Petition should be DISMISSED.
\2
In his Petition and Memorandum in support of his Petition, Mr. Sherratt argues that his
rights "were violated prior to, during, and after, his May 5, 2005" hearing before the Utah Board
of Pardons and Parole (the "Board"). Although Petitioner filed an over-length Memorandum
without first seeking leave of Court to do so, in light of his pro se status the Court has considered
-1-

his submissions in full.1 The AG also filed an over-length memorandum but obtained leave of
Court to do so. On Prebruary 3, 2009, Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Answer
Respondent's Answer. Because an Answer to the Petition does not require a responsive
pleading, the Motion is DENIED.
f3
There are a couple of preliminary matters that need to be addressed. First, Petitioner
does not expressly identify the subsection(s) of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d) under which he seeks
relief, but the Petition attacks a number of actions and decisions of the Board; the Court
construes these claims as being brought under Rule 65B(d)(2)(D). To the extent that some of
Petitioner's claims also challenge the legality of the conviction, those claims should have been
brought under Rule 65C. That said, because Petitioner has framed his challenge to the trial
court's actions as a challenge to the "jurisdiction" of the trial court, the Court construes the
claims as being brought under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A). Second, and more importantly, because of
the lengthy delay that has already occurred in adjudicating this Petition, the Court called for a
response by the AG without first evaluating whether any of Petitioner's claims were frivolous or
whether the issues raised in the Petition have already been adjudicated in prior proceedings. See
Rule 65B(b)(5). The fact that the AG has responded does not eliminate the Court's duty to make
those determinations under the Rule. Therefore, as appropriate, the Court has identified those
claims by Petitioner which are either frivolous on their face or were previously adjudicated.
Although the Court need not enter findings of fact or conclusions of law, pursuant to the Rule the
Court has provided a brief statement of its rationale (with citation to authority, as needed).
^[4
Petitioner appears to complain about the non-binding nature of the Utah sentencing
guidelines, comparing them to the federal sentencing guidelines, which he wrongly asserts are
"mandatory." United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220(2005)(striking down as unconstitutional the
mandatory provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines but retaining the Guidelines as advisory
to the courts). To the extent the Court is properly understanding the claim, the Court finds the
apparent objection to the Utah sentencing guidelines to be without basis in law or fact and
frivolous on its face. The Utah and federal guidelines are not comparable as they apply to wholly
different sentencing schemes—i.e., determinate vs. indeterminate sentencing. The
constitutionality of indeterminate sentencing schemes (such as Utah's), has been affirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore, neither Booker nor Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),

1

The-Attorney General has asked that the Court require Petitioner to comply with the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure as he is a prolific filer of multiple lawsuits. After thoroughly reviewing the record the
Court sympathizes with the AG's argument. Petitioner's multiple submissions of unrelated matters under
this case number have resulted in a voluminous and confusing Court record. His repeated failures
properly to notice motions for decision under Utah R. Civ. P. 7 have also contributed substantially to the
delays of which Petitioner has complained. Were this Petition not being dismissed, the Court would
absolutely require Petitioner to comply strictly with the rules of procedure or risk having his filings
stricken. However, for purposes of this Ruling the Court has considered all of Petitioner's submissions.
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support Petitioner's arguments.
T[5
Petitioner claims that the Board violated a number of its own Rules, starting with the
process followed by the Board in setting his original parole hearing date. Petitioner misreads the
Board rules of which he complains. As explained below at note 3, in setting his original hearing
date the Board in fact considered the appropriate information. Moreover, with respect to the
information considered by the Board at the May 2005 hearing itself, the AG correctly notes that
the Board has discretion to consider all relevant information in making its parole decisions. See
Walker v. State, 902 P.2d 148, 150 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996).
Petitioner does not claim that he was not given access to all the information upon which the
Board relied in either scheduling and conducting his parole hearing date. Petitioner's claims that
the Board has not followed its Rules in setting or conducting his parole hearing are frivolous and
should be dismissed.
^[6
Petitioner also argues that the Board violated his due process rights to notice and hearing
in connection with a 2004 special review which he argues altered his "eligibility for parole."2 The
Court rejects the claim as frivolous on its face. Essentially Petitioner complains that the Board
cancelled its request for an alienist report or a therapy report in advance of the 2005 parole
hearing, and that he should have received notice and a hearing in advance of the Board's decision
to cancel those reports. Petitioner offers no support for his due process argument with respect to
this 2004 decision. Notably, Petitioner does not argue that as a result of the 2004 special review
the Board failed to hold the previously scheduled parole hearing in 2005, or that his actual
hearing date was postponed or compromised.3 Petitioner acknowledges receiving advanced
notice of the scheduled 2005 parole hearing, reviewing the documents considered by the Board at
that hearing, appearing at the hearing, and having the opportunity to be heard. On these facts
there is simply no basis for Petitioner's claim that the Board altered his "eligibility for parole" as

2

The Court generally agrees with the AG that Petitioner has provided no information to allow the
Court to determine whether he exhausted his administrative remedies before bringing this Petition.
Nevertheless, among the materials submitted by the Petitioner there is indication that he did maintain
some correspondence regarding his participation in STOP. While not conclusive, the Court relies on this
as evidence that Petitioner at least attempted to avail himself of his administrative remedies. As a result,
the Court believes that judicial economy will ultimately be better served by considering the substance of
Petitioner's claims.
3

By letter dated June 30, 2000, the Board informed Petitioner that his "original parole grant
hearing"would be set for May 2005. Consistent with Board Rule, the letter indicated the information that
was considered in setting that date ("After carefully reviewing the Judgment(s) and Commitment(s) in
your case, taking into account the Pre-sentence Investigation Report and recommendation(s) if any from
the sentencing court, the Board has determined you will be scheduled for an original parole grant hearing
in May, 2005"). Petitioner's parole hearing in fact took place in May 2005.
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a result of the 2004 decision not to get an alienist report.
<J7
Petitioner also argues at length that he has been subject to wrongful reports regarding his
involvement, or lack thereof, with the Sex Offender Treatment Program ("STOP"). He argues
he's been wrongfully denied access to the program,4 and that he should be allowed to participate
(solely for purposes of parole consideration) even though he denies responsibility for the crime
for which he has been convicted. The fact that Petitioner's refusal to admit his guilt prevents his
admission into STOP does not violate his due process rights nor make the Board's actions
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Wright v. Carver,
2008 WL 803109 (D. Utah 2008)(slip op.)(no constitutional right to participate in rehabilitation
programs, including sex offender treatment). Petitioner also alleges that his "denial of access" to
STOP has been done in retaliation for his continued insistence that he is innocent and his
complaints that the Board has failed to investigate another inmate's alleged confession to the
crime for which Petitioner was convicted. It appears that these same claims by Petitioner were
raised and adjudicated in Sherratt v. Friel, 2005 UT App. 135, and Sherratt v. Friel, 2007 WL
1795720. See AG's Motion to Dismiss, at 3, note 1 (and accompanying exhibits). As such,
rearguing these claims is not proper in this R.65B Petition.
^J8
Petitioner alleges the Board has a "hidden agenda" regarding the "state sentencing
practice," which he claims usurps the "core judicial function" of sentencing defendants. This
allegation is also frivolous on its face. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly upheld the
constitutionality of the Board against similar challenges, holding that the power to sentence and
the power to parole are distinct powers, and that the Board's actions do not infringe on core
judicial functions. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah 1997). As
previously noted, the legal analysis of the federal sentencing guidelines in Booker and Blakely (or
of comparable guidelines in other determinate sentencing schemes) is inapposite to an
indeterminate sentencing scheme such as Utah's.
^[9
With nothing more than conclusory statements Petitioner also argues the Board's parole
decision-making and release authority violates constitutional mandates of equal protection.5
Petitioner's sole support for this contention is his bald assertion that the Board's parole release
determinations do not treat "the same conduct, or sentence" in similar manner. The Court rejects
the claim as frivolous on its face. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "[t]here is no
constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the
4

He also appears to allege some form of cover-up, claiming improper edits to the Board's parole
hearing transcript.
Petitioner has not identified any inmates (or facts concerning the circumstances of those
inmates) who are arguably "similarly situated" to him but who have been treated dissimilarly by the
Board in its parole determinations.
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expiration of a valid sentence." Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S.
1, 7 (1979). Under Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme the sentence is a prescribed range of
years, in this case, 5 years to life. The Board has the constitutional right and authority to
determine whether a convict will be granted parole prior to the expiration of his legally imposed
sentence, which in this case is a maximum of "life." The Board's exercise of authority within the
statutorily-authorized limits does not create a constitutional violation. See Preece v. House, 886
P.2d 508 (Utah 1994).
^|10
Petitioner argues that as a result of various substantive and procedural violations his trial
was not fair6, and that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case because of
problems with the Information(s) filed in this case (the original Information as well as the First
Amended, and the Second Amended, Information). Again, all these issues have been already
adjudicated in other cases brought by Petitioner. See note 1 of AG's Motion to Dismiss. These
same contentions were also the subject of this Court's ruling and Order of November 13, 2006
denying Petitioner's Rule 60(b)(4) Motion to Vacate Judgment. As an initial matter, the Court
has already noted that challenges to the validity of Petitioner's conviction appear more properly
to belong in a petition for post-conviction relief (Rule 65C), which must be brought by filing a
petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was
entered (rather than as part of the present Petition). In any event, to the extent that Petitioner
seeks to invoke R.65B(d)(2)(A), he has failed to articulate how this provision is implicated. As
such, the Court rejects these claims as being beyond the proper scope of this Petition.
Tfl 1 The Court has considered all of Petitioner's remaining arguments and finds them to be
without merit. The Court agrees with the analysis and reasoning of the AG in the Motion to
Dismiss, adopts that reasoning and incorporates it as part of this Ruling and in further support of
the Court's determination to dismiss the Petition. The Court specifically rejects Petitioner's "ex
post facto law" argument, as well as his claim that Board members (and in particular, Board
Member Gallegos), were not impartial, were biased against him, and treated him with
"unnecessary rigor." The Court also agrees with the AG that even if the Petitioner's claims had
merit, the relief Petitioner has requested (reversal of the conviction and sentence) is not available
to him through a Rule 65B petition. Thus, even if Petitioner's claims were found to be

6

For the sake of keeping this Ruling within reasonable length, the Court declines to address
.specific_ally„each,ofjhe numerousaljegationsj^egarding factual or other problems that Petitioner alleges
infected the investigative, pretrial, and/or trial processes in this case. Suffice it to say that the Court has
reviewed each and has determined the claims to be either meritless, brought in the wrong context (a R.
65B petition rather than R. 65C), or already adjudicated. To the extent that Petitioner re-alleges these
problems as improperly affecting the Board's parole determination, the Court rejects that claim as
frivolous. As noted earlier, the Board has the right to consider what the "entire record" of the case
shows, Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, as well as what Petitioner has/has not done during his period of
incarceration. See also Walker v. State, 902 P.2d 148 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995).
-5-
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meritorious (which they are not), the available relief would not extend to reversal of a conviction
and release from incarceration.
Motion to Disqualify Utah Attorney General
If 12
On February 20. 2008, Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify the AG and appoint the Salt
Lake County attorney to investigate a malfeasance in office complaint that Petitioner had
previously-and improperly-filed under this case number. The authority to bring a malfeasance in
office/complaint to remove officials is found in Utah Code §77-6-1 et seq. Pursuant to the
statute, this kind of claim must first be presented to the Presiding Judge of the district for filingit may not be filed directly See Utah Code §77-6-4. Only if the Presiding Judge approves the
filing of the complaint may it be filed as a new case. Petitioner has disregarded the procedure
expressly outlined in the Code, and has filed various iterations of his malfeasance complaint
under this case number. On three occasions the Presiding Judge has ruled on Petitioner's
misfiled complaints, in all three cases he has declined to authorize the matter to go forward. See
Minute Entries by Judge Hilder dated January 10, 2008, March 3, 2008, and February 9,2009.
Because the motion to disqualify the AG is premised on a malfeasance complaint which the
Presiding Judge has thrice denied and dismissed, this motion must also be DENIED.
113
Based on the Court's decision to deny the motion, the Court need not discuss further the
AG's Opposition thereto, Petitioner's Reply, or the AG's Motion to Strike.
Quo Warranto Motion
114
On September 12, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion for Quo Warranto Hearing.7 A Notice
to Submit Petitioner purports to bring this motion under "Rule 81, F.R. Civ. P." To the extent
that Petitioner is, in fact, seeking to invoke the authority of the Federal Rules, those rules are
inapplicable in this Court and his motion should be directed to the federal courts.
115
To be sure, Utah courts have constitutional authority to issue writs as appropriate. Utah
Const. Art. VIII, sections 3, 5 (1984). However, as noted in Renn v. Utah State Bd. Of Pardons
904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995), Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) abolished all special forms of pleadings and '
writs, including the writ of quo warranto. The closest proceeding to a quo warranto writ is
found in Rule 65B(c), which provides grounds for relief "where a person usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully-hokis_Qr£xexcises. a_public office, whether_civi] prmilitaiy ._._^_ Petitioner's present
motion, fairly read, challenges the authority and jurisdiction of the trial court "that adjudicated

A quo warranto writ or proceeding is one which orders a person to show by what right he
exercises an office, franchise, or privilege. Webster's New World Dictionary (Second College Edition
1986).
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Petitioner's case. That is different from a claim that a person has "usurp[ed], intrudefd] into, or
unlawfully h[e]ld or exercisefd] public office." Thus, it does not appear that Rule 65B(c) is the
appropriate vehicle to address the substance of Petitioner's claims.
If 16
Even if the Court were to overlook the fact that Petitioner has not stated a claim under
Rule 65B(c) (our closest analog to the quo warranto writ), the Court disagrees with Petitioner's
claim that this latest motion raises issues not previously ruled upon. In addition to the many
other state and federal cases in which Petitioner has already raised these same claims, a
comparison of the arguments raised herein with those raised in his prior Rule 60(b)(4) motion
establishes that he is making the same arguments that this Court already adjudicated in its Order
of November 13, 2006. In sum, Petitioner's latest quo warranto motion is nothing more than a
re-tread of his well-worn claims that the charging Information was not properly verified and,
therefore, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over him.8

Petitioner seeks to differentiate this motion differs from his prior Rule 60(b)(4) motion on the
basis that the present motion requires the Court to determine "whether or not the process required by
[Utah Code §] 77-2-1 was followed, or whether the documents were proper Informations ..." Utah Code
§77-2-1 provides that "[ujnless otherwise provided by law, no information may be filed charging the
commission of any felony . . . unless authorized by a prosecuting attorney." Section 77-2-1.1 states that
"[t]he prosecuting attorney shall sign all informations." It then goes on to state that "[t]he prosecuting
attorney may: (1) sign the information in the presence of a magistrate; or (2) present and file the
information in the office of the clerk where the prosecution is commenced upon the signature of the
prosecuting attorney"(emphasis added).
At the time it considered and ruled on Petitioner's Rule 60(b)(4) motion, the Court reviewed the
Informations provided by Petitioner. That review showed that the prosecuting attorney-Deputy Iron
County Attorney David E. Doxey-had signed the Informations as required by law. The original
Information was signed on 25 May 1999 and filed with the clerk of the district court on 1 June 1999;
Petitioner's copy of that Information-clearly shows the signature. While the copy of the Amended
Information dated 24 August 1999 does not bear Mr. Doxey's signature, it did carry a notation ("/s/")
suggesting that the original document had been signed. The final Information filed in this case (the
Second Amended Information, dated 11 January 2000), carried Mr. Doxey's signature. On their face,
then, these Informations clearly met the requirements of Utah Code §§77-2-1 and 1.1. Nothing more was
needed to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. This was one of the two separate and
independent grounds on which the Court based its November 2006 denial of Petitioner's Rule 60(b)(4)
motion.
-7-

3R2

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
TJ17 The Court hereby WITHDRAWS, as unnecessary, its prior Order appointing pro bono
counsel. All claims raised in the Rule 65B Petition and in Petitioner's Quo Warranto motion are
DISMISSED with prejudice and on the merits. Petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to
Answer the AG's Answer is DENIED; Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify the AG is also
DENIED.
\\ 8 There being no further matters left for decision, the Court orders that the case be
DISMISSED and CLOSED. PETITIONER IS ADVISED THAT THIS IS A FINAL
ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, ANY APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS OF THIS DATE.
Entered by the Court this 17,h day of February, 2009.
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Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Thorne.
PER CURIAM:
William Sherratt appeals the district court's denial of his
"60(b)(4) motion to vacate judgment for void jurisdiction." This
matter is before the court on its own motion for summary
disposition based upon the lack of a substantial question for
appellate review.
Sherratt brought a petition for extraordinary relief
pursuant to rule 65B(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The only claims raised in that petition concerned certain
conditions of his confinement. The petition was eventually
dismissed and Sherratt appealed the decision to this court. This
court affirmed the district court decision. See Sherratt v.
Friel, 2 006 UT App 135. During the pendency of that appeal,
Sherratt filed a motion in the district court under rule 60(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure alleging that the district
court that convicted him never obtained jurisdiction over him.
Accordingly, he argued that he should be immediately released
from prison. The district court denied the motion, and Sherratt
now appeals.

Petitions filed under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are limited in scope to those "proceedings involving
wrongful restraint on personal liberty other than those governed
by [r]ule 65C." Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87,1(18, 89 P.3d
196, aff'd on other grounds, 2005 UT 61 (quotations and citation
omitted). Thus, "rule 65B is not applicable in a challenge
focused on a criminal conviction, even if a restriction on
liberty results from the conviction." Id. Sherratt properly
filed a rule 65B petition concerning various conditions of his
confinement. However, his rule 60(b) motion to vacate judgment
for lack of jurisdiction did not relate to the allegations in the
petition. Instead, it focused on whether the court, which tried
and sentenced him, lacked jurisdiction to do so. Because the
motion was meant to attack the underlying conviction instead of
the district court's authority to rule on Sherrattfs 65B
petition, the motion was improperly brought in this case. See
id. Therefore, because Sherratt's rule 65B petition for
extraordinary relief was not a proper vehicle to challenge his
underlying conviction, the district court properly denied
Sherratt's 60(b) motion.
Affirmed.

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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